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Under international trade rules, patent protection for 
pharmaceuticals lasts 20 years. During this period, 
competitors are excluded from the market, which generally 
results in medicine prices that far exceed production costs.2 
Patent protection is particularly widespread in developing 
countries with strong pharmaceutical manufacturing 
capacity, including South Africa.3
The main defence of the patent system is based on the 
argument that it acts as an incentive for investing in 
research and development. In order to benefit from patent 
protection, manufacturers need to demonstrate that they 
have contributed sufficiently to the drug innovation process. 
In the field of HIV/AIDS, the public sector – principally 
universities and large publicly funded government research 
organisations – have contributed significantly, and 
sometimes entirely, to the research and development of 
many key ARVs. Abacavir, didanosine, stavudine, zalcitabine, 
zidovudine and the concept of protease inhibition have all 
received substantial public funding in their discovery and 
development.4,5
Public interest and patient groups have successfully 
challenged the legitimacy of a number of ARV patents, based 
on the fact that patent holders did nothing significantly 
inventive to deserve a monopoly. In Thailand, Bristol-Myers 
Squibb’s patent for didanosine was overturned on the 
grounds that the patent holder manipulated the details of 
the patent claim, and the fact that most of the research 
and development was done by the US National Institutes of 
Health.6 In India and Thailand, civil society groups managed 
to successfully block a patent application by GlaxoSmithKline 
for the combination zidovudine+lamivudine on the grounds 
that simply combining two known and already patented 
drugs was not sufficiently inventive to warrant an extended 
monopoly.7 In South Africa, the purchasing of generic 
stavudine was made possible because of a challenge to the 
licensing agreement between Bristol-Myers Squibb and the 
patent owner, Yale University.8 Each of these initiatives has 
led to significant cost savings, as is clearly demonstrated 
by the precipitate fall in the price of branded stavudine in 
South Africa, from more than US$1 539 per adult patient/
year in 2000 to less than US$77 in 2008. Generic versions 
cost even less.
Tenofovir disoproxil fumarate (TDF) is a desirable ARV 
because it is regarded as safe, requires relatively limited 
toxicity monitoring, and is administered once daily. At 
the end of January 2008, the US Patent and Trademark 
Office revoked four key patents held by Gilead Sciences 
for TDF. This followed a challenge by a US public interest 
organisation (the Public Patent Foundation) that showed 
that TDF was already a known substance by the time Gilead 
applied for the patents.9 (Much of the research work was 
done by the Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic and 
the Catholic University in Leuven, Belgium. Emtricitabine, 
which is partnered with TDF in a once-a-day dosage form, 
Truvada, was similarly discovered by public researchers at 
Emory University.) Similar patent challenges have been filed 
by civil society groups in India, and Thailand is expected to 
follow suit.
Patent challenges have been raised in part because of the 
unreasonably high cost and significant variation in pricing 
of TDF. For example, Brazil, South Africa and Thailand have 
very similar gross domestic products, but the price of TDF 
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Scaling up of antiretroviral therapy (ART) in developing countries would not have been possible without market com-
petition, which has driven down the price of standard first-line antiretroviral (ARV) drugs from more than US$12 000 
per person/year in 2000 to US$99 today. However, access to newer, second-line ARVs remains largely restricted to origi-
nator (patented) drugs. This causes significant challenges in countries where access to newer medicines is becoming 
increasingly important as programmes mature and face challenges related to drug toxicity and resistance.1 Toxicity in 
particular has emerged as a major reason for individual drug switches and regimen changes, and is strongly implicated 
in decreasing adherence.
This article focuses on international efforts to reduce the price of tenofovir, and outlines the implications of these dy-
namics for South Africa.
CHALLENGING THE TENOFOVIR MONOPOLY
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in Brazil is three times that in Thailand and six times that in 
South Africa (Table I).
In India, the TDF patent has not yet been granted by the 
Indian Patent Office, but Gilead has managed to limit generic 
competition by entering into voluntary licence agreements 
with the majority of Indian generic manufacturers capable 
of producing the product or its active pharmaceutical 
ingredient (including Matrix, Ranbaxy, Hetero, Aurobindo 
and Emcure). These voluntary licences impose restrictions 
so that, for example, manufacturers cannot export to 
middle-income countries such as South Africa and Brazil, 
preventing the option of sourcing alternative price options 
and limiting access to alternative supplies of drug in the 
event of shortage. The TDF market for Africa has been 
awarded to Aspen Pharmacare (Gilead has not patented TDF 
in South Africa, but has relied on the licensing agreement 
with Aspen to manage the market).11 However, as Gilead 
itself will not market TDF (or the combination of TDF and 
emtricitabine) in these countries, the overall result is that 
TDF remains a monopoly (single-source) product.
If Gilead’s patents are rejected by the Indian Patent Office, 
the voluntary licence agreements signed between Gilead 
and Indian manufacturers will probably become void. This 
means that generic manufacturers will be able to freely 
manufacture and export generic versions of tenofovir 
without restrictions.
The place of TDF in the management of HIV/AIDS has been 
variably described in treatment guidelines; this variability is 
directly influenced by considerations of price when applied 
to the developing world. For example, the United States 
Department of Health and Human Services Guidelines for 
the Use of Antiretroviral Agents in HIV-1-Infected Adults 
and Adolescents lists TDF and emtricitabine among its first-
line ‘preferred’ choices.12 The 6th edition of Aid for AIDS 
Guidelines (used widely in South Africa’s private sector), 
while noting that TDF was not yet registered in the country 
in 2007, stated that ‘… [i]ts best current role is in initial 
therapy, combined with either lamivudine or emtricitabine’.13 
In March 2007, the World Health Organization (WHO) 
included TDF in the 15th Model Essential Medicines List.14 
In May 2007, a WHO Working Group recommended that 
TDF be included (with lamivudine, considered equivalent to 
emtricitabine) as the preferred non-nucleoside/nucleotide 
reverse transcriptase (NRTI) background option for second-
line ARV therapy in developing countries using thymidine-
based first-line regimens. A number of countries in 
southern Africa have either moved to using TDF as part of 
first-line regimens (Lesotho) or are considering such a move 
(Zambia). TDF is increasingly needed in all programmes using 
stavudine as first-line therapy for the growing number of 
patients who develop toxicity to stavudine (lipoatrophy, 
peripheral neuropathy, symptomatic hyperlactataemia 
and lactic acidosis). One study found that 21% of patients 
starting on a d4T-based regimen required a switch to an 
alternative ARV within 3 years because of toxicity.15
Cost is a major factor for considering a move to providing 
TDF as a first-line ART option. A recent cost-effectiveness 
analysis estimated that, for TDF to replace d4T at a 
neutral cost, the price of TDF would need to fall to US$72 
per person/year – a third of the current price (personal 
communication – Sydney Rosen). This is not unrealistic. 
Experts involved in ARV price negotiations and forecasting 
are anticipating significant reductions for TDF. It is expected 
that TDF is likely to fall to around US$120 per person/year 
in the next 12 - 18 months; in the long term, it is certainly 
possible that prices could fall to well below $100 (personal 
communication – Aaron Pattillo, Clinton Foundation).
However, there are two major obstacles to South Africa 
being able to access these prices: the ARV tender process 
for 2008, and the medicines registration process.
The Department of Health is in the process of concluding 
the ARV tender for 2008 - 2011. The first ARV tender, 
concluded in 2004, locked the government into a 3-year 
agreement with manufacturers. Prices were, as with other 
medicines tenders, set for the entire period, scheduled for 
pre-determined price escalations at various time points, 
or linked to international exchange rate fluctuations. The 
request for proposals noted that ‘… [a]ll contracts are 
subjected to the General Conditions of Contract (GCC) 
issued in accordance with the Regulations in terms of the 
Public Finance Management Act, 1999: Framework for 
Supply Chain Management that was promulgated in the 
Government Gazette No. 25767 on 5 December 2003’; it also 
indicated that ‘Special Conditions of Contract (SCC)’ would 
apply. Therefore, while the GCC state that ‘… [t]he supplier 
shall indemnify the purchaser against all third-party claims 
of infringement of patent, trademark, or industrial design 
rights arising from use of the goods or any part thereof by 
the purchaser’, the SCC included the following two clauses 
(bold text is in the original):16
3.3  Bidders must comply with the requirements of the 
Patents Act, 1978 (Act 57 of 1978) and the Trade Marks 
Act, 1993 (Act 194 of 1993). Bidders must submit a 
copy of the actual patent or an agreement with the 
patent holder with the bid document at the closing 
date and time of the request for proposal/quotation.
3.4  Bidders must comply with any legal requirements with 
regard to voluntary licences obtained, and proof of 
agreements in this regard must be supplied with the bid 
document at the closing date and time of the request 
for proposal/quotation.
These additional clauses are extraordinary – they are not 
found in other medicines tenders – and potentially highly 
restrictive. If a more affordable source of TDF becomes 
available in a year’s time, it is not clear whether the 2008 
Country  GDP per capita Cost of tenofovir
Brazil  US$8 402  US$1 387
India  US$3 452  US$199
South Africa US$11 110 US$235
Thailand  US$8 677  US$454
Best available price   US$195
TAbLE I. COMPARISON OF TDF PRICES IN SELECTED 
DEVELOPING COuNTRIES, 200710
IMPLICATIONS FOR SOuTH AFRICA
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tender will allow for its procurement. It is also not clear 
whether a generic manufacturer, which holds neither 
patent nor agreement with the patent holder, will be able to 
enter the process, even if that generic production is entirely 
consistent with intellectual property law.
Two other clauses in the 2004 request for proposals relate 
to registration and are standard for all medicine tenders:
3.1  Bidders offering medicines which require registration in 
terms of the Medicines and Related Substances Act, (Act 
101 of 1965 as amended), must be in possession of valid 
registration certificates, issued in terms of the said Act 
at the closing date and time of the request for proposal/
quotation, and must comply with the conditions under 
which the medicines have been registered. Copies of 
registration certificates for drugs offered must be 
supplied with the bid document at the closing date 
and time of the request for proposal/quotation.
3.2  Bidders offering medicines must supply proof of 
positive GMP status with the Medicines Control 
Council which must be submitted with the bid 
document at the closing date and time of the request 
for proposal/quotation.
The registration of generic TDF products may therefore 
present a second obstacle to procuring more affordable 
versions of this highly desirable ARV. TDF was only 
registered in South Africa in mid-2007, even though it 
has been registered in the USA since 2001 and in Europe 
since 2002. The registration dossier was finally submitted 
to the South African Medicines Control Council early in 
2006. Even if affordable, quality-assured, generic versions 
of TDF become available this year, the registration of these 
products for use in South Africa may take an unnecessarily 
long time. The popular ‘all-in-one’ single tablet co-
formulation of tenofovir/emtricitabine/efavirenz, which is 
widely used in developed countries as one of the safest and 
most convenient combinations, will probably take years to 
be registered in South Africa because of the complexity of 
having two pharmaceutical companies owning different 
patents.
That generic versions are needed is amply demonstrated by 
the lack of price differentials between the tender prices and 
private sector single-exit prices for products only available 
from brand manufacturers. Ideally, the volumes guaranteed 
by large-scale programmes in the State sector and the 
relatively simple product delivery processes should mean 
that the State should enjoy significant cost reductions. This 
has not uniformly been the case. For example, efavirenz 
(EFV) 600 mg tablets are sold to the South African public 
and private sectors at the same price (US$238 per person/
year). In contrast, nevirapine (NVP) 200 mg tablets are 
provided to the State at US$74.50 per person/year by a 
generic manufacturer, which sells the same product in the 
private sector for US$276.84. The branded version sells 
to the private sector for US$983. Nevirapine 50 mg/5 ml 
suspension provides an object lesson in the consequences 
of insisting on the existence of concluded voluntary licences 
at the time of tender submission. The State currently 
purchases a bottle at US$25.86, whereas the lowest-priced 
licensed generic sells to the private sector at US$13.13. 
While a tender provides a measure of stability over time, it 
may also limit the ability of the State to take advantage of 
new clinical evidence and/or new generic entrants.
ARV scale-up in the developing world was made possible 
because of a simple, affordable first-line regimen using 
public health principles. As HIV treatment programmes 
mature, the need for newer medicines to overcome toxicity 
and resistance is becoming increasingly urgent. Faced with 
rising treatment costs, a number of developing countries 
have taken strong action against the monopolies on key 
ARV patents, resulting in significant cost savings.
For South Africa, broader access to TDF has the potential 
to simplify treatment by offering a more favourable side-
effect profile, an issue that is particularly important in 
facilitating the provision of care at the primary care level. 
Further potential for simplification is presented by the 
use of TDF in the once-a-day combination of tenofovir/
emtricitabine/efavirenz (and potentially tenofovir/
lamivudine/nevirapine).
Internationally, the cost of TDF is set to fall significantly 
in the coming months. The price that South Africa will 
pay will depend on whether the tender process will allow 
for the inclusion of new, unpatented medicines and how 
quickly these new products can be registered. Neither of 
these issues is immutable: they are simple matters of policy 
choice.
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